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In this article and the next, we present two addresses given
by prominent scholars at the May 2002 Maine Town
Meeting sponsored by the Margaret Chase Smith Library in
Skowhegan. In the first, Theiss-Morse, a political scientist
at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, takes issue with
each of the alleged beneficial effects of increased participa-
tion and deliberation in politics. She presents evidence from
her own research with colleague John Hibbing that suggests
a more participatory democracy does not necessarily result
in better decisions, a better political system or better people.
Rather, most Americans would prefer not to have to partic-
ipate in politics at all. Theiss-Morse explains where this
view comes from and, in the end, argues for a civic educa-
tion process that better prepares young people for the gritty
divisiveness of our democratic system..  
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Atrumpet call rings out across America: we mustincrease citizen participation in politics; we must
give the people a stronger voice. For far too long, the
argument goes, Americans have been pushed out of the
political system. We must use every means possible to
bring them back—more ballot initiatives and referenda,
more use of technology to enhance direct participation,
more involvement in voluntary associations, more use
of citizen issue juries or deliberative opinion polls. If
we could just get more people involved in politics,
numerous benefits would accrue to the political system.
We would get better decisions, a better political system,
and better people. In essence, we would finally have a
strong democracy.
John Hibbing and I have taken issue with these
claims in our book Stealth Democracy (2002a). In this
talk, I will tackle each of the alleged beneficial effects
of increased participation and deliberation—better
decisions, a better system, and better people—by
laying out the proponents’ arguments and then raising
questions based on empirical research from social
psychology and political science. I will then discuss 
two reasons why calls to increase public participation 
in politics won’t work. I will show that people’s under-
standing of how democracy ought to work and of
their role in that democracy is not at all in line with
participatory democracy. I will conclude with a brief
discussion of whether Americans should get the
democracy they want.
BETTER DECISIONS?
One benefit claimed by proponents of a moreparticipatory democracy is that we will get better 
decisions if people are more actively involved in polit-
ical decisionmaking. This contention is certainly not
surprising. In 1785, Condorcet’s Jury Theorem demon-
strated that if each person on a jury has private infor-
mation and reveals that private information to others
during deliberation, the decision following deliberation
will be a step above that which would have occurred
had no deliberation taken place. As people become
aware of new ideas, arguments and facts, they can
obviously make more informed and, therefore, better
decisions. Proponents further argue that deliberation
and participation push people 
to think beyond their self-interest
—to think of “we” instead of
“me”—because they are forced 
to confront alternative views.
Awareness of others’ diverse
needs and concerns broadens
people’s understandings of the
problems and forces them away
from their myopic views.
As good as these arguments
sound, they are unlikely to play
out in the real world of politics.
Robert Axelrod (1997) has
shown that people tend to
choose to interact with those
who are quite similar to them-
selves. For example, contrary to
Robert Putnam’s vision of group
involvement, voluntary associa-
tions tend to be highly homoge-
neous and therefore provide little
exposure to dissimilar political
views. If there is a chance for real
disagreement to arise, groups often actively discourage
debate of the issues. To quote Nina Eliasoph (1998,
63), “In an effort to appeal to regular, unpretentious
fellow citizens without discouraging them, [volunteer
groups] silence public-spirited deliberation.”
Perhaps I am interpreting the proponents’ 
arguments too narrowly. Perhaps better decisions arise
even from discussion within homogeneous groups, 
in which case it wouldn’t matter that people tend to
associate with those who are similar. Unfortunately,
research from social psychology simply does not back
this up. When people deliberate in homogeneous
groups, their attitudes tend to become polarized
toward the extremes. For example, Myers and Bishop
found that unprejudiced students became more unprej-
udiced after a group discussion (becoming less preju-
diced by about a half a point on a seven-point scale),
while prejudiced students became even more strongly
prejudiced (becoming more prejudiced by about a
point and a half ). Homogeneous group discussions,
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necessarily lead to better decisions, and could lead 
to worse decisions.
BETTER SYSTEM?
What about the argument that increased participa-tion and deliberation lead to a better system?
The proponents are concerned here with people’s
beliefs in the legitimacy of the political system. They
argue that if people have the opportunity to participate
in political decisionmaking, or at least believe the deci-
sion was based on inclusive and responsible debate,
they will feel better about the process and the decision.
Tom Tyler, a social psychologist, and his colleagues
(1985) offer empirical evidence for this assertion.
People who believed they had a chance to voice their
arguments in an Illinois traffic and misdemeanor court
viewed the judge’s decision on their case as more legiti-
mate and were more accepting even of adverse deci-
sions than were people who believed they had no voice
in the proceedings. These results suggest deliberation
and participation can make people feel better about the
political system even if they do not always get what
they want from that system.
Does having a chance to discuss their position on
an issue really lead people to view the system as more
legitimate? To answer this question, let’s look again 
at Tom Tyler’s work. Tyler, like most researchers who
proclaim the positive effects of voice, relies on evidence
from the legal system where the decisionmaker—the
judge—has no vested interest in the particular outcome
of the case. People widely believe that judges are
neutral arbiters, applying the law as prescribed by
precedent and the Constitution. But this is not the 
case when it comes to most political decisionmakers.
People believe members of Congress, for example, act
self-interestedly most, if not all, of the time. When the
decisionmaker is seen to be self-interested, people view
the opportunity for voice as a sham. Why might this 
be so? Imagine yourself in a situation where a decision-
maker—we’ll call her Jane—is in a position to make 
a decision that benefits herself at your expense. In one
situation, Jane makes the decision without any input
from you. In the other, Jane makes the decision after
you have made an impassioned plea for an outcome
more beneficial to yourself. Wouldn’t you be less
accepting of the outcome in the second situation? 
After all, your opportunity to provide input into the
decision makes it certain that Jane was aware of your
position. Jane looked you right in the eye and decided
against you and for herself. Is there any reason to
expect that such a situation would produce anything
other than frustration?
My colleague John Hibbing and I (2002b)
conducted an experiment to see if people actually did
become more frustrated after having had a say in a
decisionmaking situation. We found that people who
had the opportunity to express their desires to a self-
interested decisionmaker were much more upset with
the outcome and with the process than were people
who did not have the opportunity to express their
desires to the decisionmaker. Since most political 
situations involve decisionmakers whom people at least
perceive to be self-interested, it is very likely that having
voice increases people’s frustration and their feeling
that the system is not legitimate.
BETTER PEOPLE?
The final argument proponents make is that partici-pation and deliberation in the political system will
be beneficial for the people themselves. In essence, they
will become better people. Back in the 1700s, Jean
Jacques Rousseau argued that in the process of inter-
acting with others on societal and political issues, a
person’s “ideas take on a wider scope, his sentiments
become ennobled, and his whole soul elevated” (1946,
263). In the 1800s, John Stuart Mill argued for the
educative benefits of participation in public affairs.
…it is very likely that having voice 
increases people’s frustration and their 
feeling that the system is not legitimate.
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Many modern writers also have been enthusiastic
champions of this point of view.  For example, Robert
Paul Wolff (1970, 36-7) claims that, were citizens to
be directly involved in deliberation, “America would 
see an immediate and invigorating rise in interest in
politics.… Politics would be on the lips of every man,
woman, and child, day after day.” 
I would certainly agree that face-to-face interaction
can have beneficial effects. For example, in Stanley
Milgram’s famous experiments on obedience, he found
that people were less likely to administer what they
thought was a potentially lethal electric shock to
another person if they could actually see the person.
Latane and Darley (1970) found that even a brief
meeting with a person who later had a (simulated)
epileptic seizure greatly increased the likelihood that
the new acquaintance would respond to cries of
distress. So face-to-face interaction is likely to heighten
positive emotions such as empathy. But when there is
disagreement, it can also lead to heightened negative
emotions: anger, aggression, feelings of competition,
and denigration of the other. People often respond to
these negative emotions by becoming more entrenched
in their original views or by clamming up. As a result,
as Jane Mansbridge argues, “assemblies designed to
produce feelings of community can… backfire” (1983,
273). We want people to agree with us, which is why
we tend to gravitate toward those who hold similar
views. When we are confronted with conflicting views,
deliberation makes it more difficult to think everyone
does agree with us.
A major problem with deliberation, as people 
see it, is the inequalities that quickly surface in public
discussions. The best examples of this come from
studies of direct deliberative democracy in action: 
New England town meetings. Mansbridge’s (1983)
fascinating account of the events and sentiments
surrounding town meetings in the real but fictitiously
named New England town of Selby is the most
revealing. After observing town meetings, Mansbridge
interviewed many of the participants and concluded
that face-to-face deliberation actually “accentuates
rather than redress(es) the disadvantage of those with
the least power in a society” (ibid., 277). The major
reason for this exacerbation is simply variation in
people’s communication skills. As a retired businessman
from Selby put it, “some people are eloquent and can
make others feel inferior. They can shut them down. 
I wouldn’t say a word at town meetings unless they got
me madder’n hell” (ibid., 62). Another said, “we have
natural born orators, don’t we? I think we do. It’s just
the same as anything else. They carry more than their
share of the weight”  (ibid., 83). A farmer had similar
sentiments: “There’s a few people who really are brave
enough to get up and say what they think in town
meetings… now, myself, I feel inferior, in ways, to
other people… forty percent of the people on this road
that don’t show up for town meeting—a lot of them
feel that way” (ibid., 60). All in all, it is difficult to
dispute Mansbridge’s conclusion that “participation in
face-to-face democracies can make participants feel
humiliated, frightened, and even more powerless than
before” (ibid., 7). Not surprisingly, research shows that
the people who are most likely to “feel humiliated,
frightened, and even more powerless than before” 
are women, minorities, and the less educated.
STEALTH DEMOCRACY
I’m sure that at this point some of you are thinkingthat I am opposed to people participating in politics.
That couldn’t be further from the truth. I would love 
to see more people participate in politics, and I spend
much of my time in the classroom trying to draw
young adults out of their apathy. But I think it is falla-
cious to believe that pushing people into participating
in politics will lead to all sorts of positive outcomes.
First, I don’t think people can be pushed to participate;
second, I believe that, given their current understanding
of democracy, pushing people to participate would 
be harmful to them and to the political system. I 
will discuss these two arguments and then finish by
discussing what people want in a democratic system
and raising the question of whether they should get
what they want.
Why do I think people cannot be pushed to
participate more actively in politics?  The basic answer
is that people don’t like politics and would much rather
spend their time doing other things; in fact, they would
rather do almost anything other than participate in
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politics. Remember, I’m a polit-
ical scientist—I love keeping 
up on what’s happening in the
political world. But the average
American just doesn’t like poli-
tics. My colleague John Hibbing
and I (2002a) conducted focus
groups around the country in
1997 (including two in Maine).
Here are some of the comments
made by the focus group partic-
ipants which demonstrate
clearly that people just don’t
want to take the time to be
politically involved:
Eric: We have avenues to contact our representatives…
we just choose not to. 
Jackie: We’re too apathetic…
Mike: There were times I didn’t vote. Honestly, it 
wasn’t because I didn’t think my opinion counted, 
it was because that was out of my way. You know, 
I had something else that I wanted to do that day. 
Chuck: I think the biggest problem with our govern-
ment is not the government, it’s the people…  
We really don’t care to take an active role and it 
don’t bother us, you know, as long as it doesn’t 
directly affect me. Just leave me alone.
Glen: And if this isn’t going to impact me, I’m not
going to [get involved in politics].
Gary: See, we’re all concerned about survival, what 
we have to do eight hours a day in order to [pay the]
bills, and therefore, regardless of what’s taking place
across town that really irritates you, you say, “well,
that’s across the town.”  Let me do my eight hours 
and do my thing rather than really getting involved.
Michelene: When I leave here, when I walk out this
door, I’m not going to volunteer for anything. I’m not
going to get involved in anything. I mean I know this.
I’m not going to pretend I’m some political activist. 
I’m lazy. I’m not going to do it. I’m too busy obsessing
on other things going on in my life.
Robin: That’s how most people are.
Michelene: I am.
Michelene is right on target when it comes to
Americans’ views of political participation. Most people
believe they are “too busy obsessing on other things” 
in their lives. Back when I was working on my disserta-
tion, I asked people why they believed they did not
live up to their standard of good citizenship. The
respondents overwhelmingly said they were too busy
with other things going on in their lives: their jobs,
their families, and so on. The focus group respondents
also emphasized their busy schedules. But they also
added the nuance that people are not motivated to
make time for politics. Let me illustrate with one focus
group exchange:
Carol: You know, we say that we don’t have time, but
nobody goes to city council meetings. I had to go for 
a class. I had to go, so I went. I don’t have to go now,
so I don’t go. Wheel of Fortune is on. I’m comfortable.
It’s cold out. So I’m as guilty as anybody.
John:  And the other thing is, you know, no offense 
to you, but . . . people in general are, like, “I don’t have
time. I don’t have time.” But how many of us make
time to watch ER?
Many people do not find politics intrinsically
interesting. They do not want to engage with the 
political process. They do not want to follow political
issues because they do not care about most issues.
Why do people dislike politics? I will discuss 
two reasons: 1) people’s overestimation of consensus
and their subsequent lack of appreciation of political
disagreement, and 2) people’s dislike of standard
elements of democracy.  First, people overwhelmingly
believe there is a consensus among Americans on the
important issues of the day. Psychologists have consis-
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consensus.”  That is, people tend to see their own atti-
tudes as typical so they overestimate the degree to
which others share their opinions. This pattern almost
certainly applies to perceptions of issue interest as well.
Those not interested in political issues tend to believe
that most other ordinary people are also not interested
in any political issues. Those interested in, say, educa-
tion policy overestimate public concern about education
and underestimate public interest in other policy areas.
Evidence for this false consensus comes from a survey
John Hibbing and I (2002a) conducted in 1998. Fully
80% of the respondents believed there was widespread
agreement on what is the most important problem
facing the nation. In fact, the most identified problem
(crime) was mentioned by only 6.5%. People do agree
on certain big issues—wanting a lower crime rate,
better education, better national security—but fail 
to recognize that they would likely disagree heatedly
over the means to achieve those ends. Because people
believe a consensus exists, they do not comprehend any
legitimate justification for intense disagreement on the
issues. When the political arena is filled with intense
policy disagreement, people conclude that the reason
must be illegitimate—namely, the influence of special
interests. After all, the reasoning goes, people like me
could not be the cause of bitter policy disagreements
on all those issues because we do not care that much,
because we do not see their relevance, and because
even when a particular policy goal is important to us,
we cannot understand why bickering over the details 
of proposed solutions is necessary.
The second reason for people’s dislike of politics
flows from the first. People’s overestimation of
consensus leads them to view much of democratic poli-
tics as unnecessary. If 80% of the people are in agree-
ment, then there is no need for democratic procedures
designed to allow politicians to come to a decision
amidst wildly diverse views—such as debating the
issues and compromising on solutions. Our survey
results provide evidence for people’s dislike of these
democratic procedures. Eighty-six percent of respon-
dents said that “elected officials would help the country
more if they would stop talking and just take action 
on important problems.” Sixty percent agreed that
“what people call compromise is really just selling out
on one’s principles.” A focus group respondent under-
scores this view: “I’ll tell you right off the bat the thing
that I don’t like, or maybe I just don’t understand it,
is… where it seems like you have someone over here
and someone over here and they’re always fighting,
although they’re both supposed to be working for this
common good. You know they’re always, ‘well, he said
this and you said that,’ you know, bickering, and it
doesn’t seem like there’s so much concern about where
we’re going rather than where each other’s been.” The
people’s impatience with deliberation and compromise
is an important element of the American political
system, one that proponents of participatory democracy
ignore. Even though Americans say they want democ-
ratic decisionmaking, they do not believe in standard
elements of it, such as debate and compromise, and are
quite drawn to what John Hibbing and I (2002a) call
stealth democracy, which I will now describe.
If Americans could have their druthers, they would
not have to participate in politics at all. Representatives
would simply understand the concerns of ordinary
people because they are ordinary people themselves
and because they spend time among other ordinary
people. No public input would be necessary. How is
such a system democratic?  The people want to be
certain that if they ever did want to get involved, if an
issue at some point in the future happened to impinge
so directly on their lives that they were moved to ask
the system for something, their request would be taken
with the utmost seriousness. This, to many people, is 
as democratic as they want their political system to be;
they do not want a system that is characterized by
regular sensitivity to every whim of the people (and
which thus expects and requires an attentive and
involved public), but rather a system that is instinctively
in touch with the problems of real Americans and that
would respond with every ounce of courtesy and atten-
tiveness imaginable if those real Americans ever did
make an actual request upon the system. This form 
of latent representation is not just what people would
settle for, it is what they prefer since it frees them from
the need to follow politics. For this to happen, though,
people need to be assured that decisionmakers are
interested in them as people, are potentially open to
popular input, and are not benefitting materially from
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their service and decisions. This desire for empathetic,
unbiased, other-regarding, yet uninstructed public offi-
cials is about as distinct as possible from the claim that
people really want to be more involved in politics than
they already are if only the system would let them.
If this interpretation of people’s procedural prefer-
ences is correct, if indeed they are not suspicious of the
concept of elite decisionmaking generally but rather
only suspicious of those elites whom they perceive as
able and willing to serve selfish interests, then people’s
desire to stay out of the political process should lead
them to be surprisingly open to empowering any elite
they believe will not be particularly selfish. People
believe elected officials are irreparably self-serving. Is it
possible for them to envision elite decisionmakers who
are not?  To be sure, this is a difficult image to conjure,
but two items in the survey make an attempt. They read:
1. Our government would run better if decisions
were left up to successful business people.
2. Our government would run better if decisions
were left up to non-elected, independent
experts rather than politicians or the people.
While neither of these statements advocates
replacing democracy with a dictatorial style of govern-
ment, it is fair to say that support for business-type
approaches to governing or for turning authority over
to something as amorphous and as unaccountable as
“non-elected, independent experts” instead of “politi-
cians or the people” suggests moving in a different
direction from the one espoused by the proponents 
of participatory democracy. Giving more political influ-
ence to successful business people and to unelected
experts would entail a significant diminution in the
influence of the run-of-the-mill American. If the propo-
nents of more citizen participation are right, surely 
the American people would reject such notions out 
of hand. However, if the argument I have been making 
is right, these less-than-democratic options would
appeal to a substantial number of people.
And they do. Surprising percentages of people
respond favorably to the notion of decisionmaking
structures that are not democratic and not even repub-
lican. Nearly one-third of the respondents agreed that
the political system would be better if “decisions 
were left to successful business people” and a similar
percentage agreed the political system would be better
if “decisions were left to non-elected experts” rather
than to politicians or the people. Some people, of
course, liked both the expert and the business people
options, but cross-tabulation indicates nearly half of all
respondents agreed with at least one of these two less
than democratic options.
Just short of half the adult population in the
United States sees some real benefit to transferring
decisionmaking authority to entities that are, for all
intents and purposes, unaccountable to ordinary people.
John Hibbing and I (2002a) believe the key to
explaining this sentiment is recognition that many
Americans accept these two notions: 1) ordinary people
are more or less in agreement on the fundamental goals
for the nation, and 2) governing is, therefore, basically
a management problem of determining how best to
achieve those goals. Since the people agree on societal
goals, no conflict need exist, and governing is reduced
to the mechanical process of implementing a good plan
for attaining these goals. In a stealth democracy,
governmental procedures are not visible to people
unless they go looking; the people do not routinely
play an active role in making decisions, in providing
input to decisionmakers, or in monitoring decision-
makers. The goal in stealth democracy is for decisions
to be made efficiently, objectively, and without commo-
tion and disagreement. As such, procedures that do not
register on people’s radar screens are preferred to the
noisy and divisive procedures typically associated with
democratic government.
Should Americans be given the government they
want? Should they be given stealth democracy?  One
possible answer is a straightforward “no.” People don’t
like the current system, but perhaps we should simply
admit that government will often be unpopular and 
live with it. Certainly, the U.S. government can survive
being unpopular. It has done so for most of its 200-
plus year history. Still, there are costs associated with
the public’s intense negativism toward government.
Politicians, sensitive to public disapprobation, may
choose to avoid difficult policy matters. In the spring 
of 1998, the leadership in Congress worried that if it
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adopted an agenda that addressed difficult issues, the
popularity of the institutions and, with it, the majority
party would plummet. It therefore followed a conscious
strategy of laying low. Evidence also exists that quality
candidates sometimes choose not to run for election or
reelection to positions in unpopular institutions such as
Congress. Disapproval of government leads the public
to be less likely to comply with laws.  Simply accepting
the status quo is not necessarily benign.
Another option is to reduce the ability of politi-
cians to be self-serving in an attempt to make them
more empathetic and less self-interested. How could
this be accomplished? There are several possibilities.
One is to reduce the pay of public officials. Americans
believe public officials are grossly overpaid, even as
they underestimate, for example, the congressional
salary. Americans would be quite happy if public offi-
cials were paid minimum wage.
A second possibility is to reduce the ability of
special interests to provide lucrative benefits to public
officials in exchange for legislation. Americans not 
only believe that special interest groups buy their way
through Washington, but that their innumerable gifts 
to members of Congress—the cushy vacations in the
Bahamas and the opulent parties in Washington—
also lead these elected officials to lose touch with the
American people. Americans would be wildly happy if
laws forbade special interests from contacting members
of Congress, from providing money or any other lavish
benefits to elected officials, and from giving ex-public
officials a job. But removing the perceived remunera-
tion offered by special interests is virtually impossible
without violating provisions of the Constitution,
primarily the First Amendment.
A final option is the one I endorse. I believe that
people’s willingness to settle for stealth democracy is
based on, or at least is encouraged by, their misunder-
standings of democratic politics. We need to teach
people, through the education system, that Americans
legitimately disagree on many important issues. It is
possible for ordinary Americans to care about the
Mideast, about tourism in Hawaii, about the spotted
owl, or about racial patterns in college admissions, 
even if others do not. People need to be convinced
that, while elements of the common good, such as low
crime rates and good education, may not be up for
debate, the best method of achieving the common
good is. Experts are not all in agreement; one solution
is not as good as another; details matter. If people are
ever going to tolerate politicians who are debating and
compromising with each other on a range of issues,
people must be convinced that the issues matter to
other real people and that not all strategies for tackling
each issue are equally effective.
The proponents of a more participatory democracy
mistakenly think that pushing people to be involved in
political processes that the people perceive to be irrele-
vant and biased toward special interest groups would
somehow have a beneficial effect—that people would
eventually be drawn in or that their participation would
lead them to conclude the process was fair and relevant.
The empirical evidence indicates this is not the case.
Exposing people to a system they believe is flawed 
will only add to their frustration. People first need to
be convinced that the political system deals with issues
that are relevant to some ordinary people and does so
in a way that is not designed to benefit only politicians
and special interests.
The current approach to civic education, with its
emphasis on civic facts, volunteer service, and commu-
nity, is wholly unable to show students the realities of
political conflict. Constitutional facts and impassioned
pleadings to vote and to be good citizens are not the
answer. We need to expose students to the range of
issue-interests of people across the United States and 
to simulations illustrating the challenges of coming to
agreement in the face of divided opinion. Students will
not become good citizens by memorizing lists of what
a good citizen does but, rather, by recognizing that
ordinary people have refreshingly different interests,
that these interests must be addressed even when they
We need to teach people… that Americans
legitimately disagree on many important issues.
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appear tangential, that each issue has an array of
possible solutions, and that finding the most appro-
priate solution requires time, effort, and conflict.
When schools avoid controversial political issues,
which they tend to do, students are left with only a
saccharin civil side of politics and are therefore more
likely to react negatively when, in the real world, they
are exposed to the gritty, barbaric side of politics. I’ll
end with a quotation from Jean Bethke Elshtain (1995,
62): “Western democracies are not doing a good job of
nurturing those democratic dispositions that encourage
people to accept that they can’t always get what they
want.” She continues, “if we spurn those institutional
forms and matrices that enable us to negotiate our
differences and to mediate them in civil and political
ways, the result will be not more variety and pluralism
but less” (ibid., xiii). 
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